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Symposium

The United States and the World Economy
Columbia University
School of International and Public Affairs
Thursday, 14 April 1994

Jagdish Bhagwati
The World Trading System
he Uruguay Round is closing this week after a marathon of
negotiations stretching well over seven years; so the timing
of this panel is exquisite, from my viewpoint. The
ceremony, besides, is in Marrakech, an exotic place that sets our
minds racing with thoughts of "Casablanca," Humphrey Bogart
and Ingrid Bergman. Indeed, one can imagine a movie being
made of this historic occasion that will transform the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade {GAIT) into the World Trade
Organization (WTO), with Peter Ustinov cast as Peter Sutherland,
the brilliant and portly new director general of the GAIT who
finally brought the round to successful conclusion, Dustin Hoffman playing our own inimitable Mickey Kantor, and perhaps Al
Pacino as the elegant and suave Sir Leon Brittan of the European
Union (E.U.): the three principal players in the closing days of the
r ound.
In any event, the closure of the round puts the GAIT, or its new
version, WTO, right at the center of the world trading system. This
is a triumph that should not be underestimated. It was only a few
years ago that my good friend Lester Thurow, reading the mood
around him, had pronounced at Davos that the GATT was dead.
His colleague at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Rudiger Dornbusch, had urged that the GAIT be killed. And their
brilliant MIT colleague, Paul Krugman, before his celebrated
return to the fold of free trade and multilateralism, had flirted
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with both thoughts. Evidently, you are affected by the company
you keep.
Fortunately, this anti-GAIT school (christened by me the
"Memorial Drive School", since MIT's famous economics department is located at Memorial Drive in Cambridge, while the
phrase also evokes aptly the funereal view of the GATI that the
school epitomized) seems to be more obviously silly than when
some of us pronounced its demerits some years ago. 1 That
school's demise and the GATT's success are a cause for celebration.
So is President Bill Clinton's belated but strong support for the
Round, though we mus t still see him take the agreement skillfully
through Congress in the coming year.
All this is on the positive side of the ledger. But there are also
problems that lie ahead that threaten the world trading system in
varying degrees and warrant careful examination. I will touch on
just two of the central problems confronting us today.
A first danger point we currently see is the increasing preoccupation in the European Union and in the United States with the
distributional effects of freer trade with the developing countries.
In consequence, a new North-South divide is opening up. Traditionally, economists have had to fight the "pauper labor" argument agains t free trade by the North with the South. This
argument falsely asserts that trading with cheaper-labor
countries will harm a country's overall economic welfare; in
reality, the case for free trade is proof against this charge. But the
new fear is not that trading with countries with paupers will h arm
oneself; rather it is that such trade will produce more paupers in
one's own midst. In other words, the fear is that our proletariat,
the unskilled, will be immiserized by freer trade with the poor
countries of the South.
This fear comes from the experience of the 1980s when, in the
E.U., unemployment increased and, in the United States, the real
wages of the unskilled fell. While nearly all careful studies show
that the causes were an overwhelmingly technical change that
saved unskilled labor, and that North-South trade had very little

1.

See Jagdish Bhagwati, The World Trading System at Risk (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1991) Chapter 1.

280
· ··· · •••

... .. ,.• . ... . ·.·· ··· ····• · · ···· ·• •••••···· · · · •......,.......·. . ••. , n. ·· · · ••••• · · ···••-.,.-.,.... .·. ~·. . . ........... . ...........,-...· .· ···...,,.,

Copyright © 2001 . All Rights Reserved.

Journal of International Affairs

The GATT is similarly under pressure to adopt measures to
harmonize up the environmental standards in developing
countries, and attempts have begun in earnest, with the United
States teaming up with France (that great ally of ours on trade, as
you will recall from the disputes we had over E.U. agriculture and
audiovisual services at the round) to push a social clause onto the
GATT. The case for such upward harmonization, and its linkage to
trade as well, is exceptionally weak, and developing countries
have raised objections to it. But the capture of these issues by
"green" and "blue" protectionists gives them great salience in the
developed countries, while the ability to hide behind the umbrella of "social causes" in advancing these issues gives them the
cachet of high moral ground. In short, one almost sees the white
man's burden being used to advance the white man's interest.
One also sees, in the selection of issues and the precise shape
being given to them, the other cynical reality: that stones are
(properly) thrown at other people's glass houses by people who
(improperly) construct fortresses around their own.4
To put it yet another way, what one is beginning to see now is
demands from developed countries to introduce special restrictions on trade of the developing countries. Ironically, just as
Special and Differential (S&D) Treatment in favor of the developing countries has finally been virtually abandoned as a GATI
principle after years of intellectual battle, we are now getting into
Reverse S&D, designed to work against the developing countries!
It will be a major task for economists, and free-trade-oriented
politicians, to confront these new problems. The main task will be

~-

Thus, the United States itself has serious problems with its children. Recent studies
show that more than four million children Jive in great hazard, and black children's
infant mortality rates and life expectancy are a matter of shame for a country of such
relative affluence. Yet the focus of our unions is on children in developing countries,
since that is where they think their competition comes from! Ironically, contrasting
elements of hypocrisy are to be found in our policy positions on intellectual property
protection regarding pharmaceuticals. While Hillary Rodham Clinton denounces
these companies for the "highN prices charged for va.ccines for our own children,
President Bill Clinton had no qualms about asking for the last ounce of flesh from the
developing countries for these companies (in fonn of greater patent protection) and
thereby hurting the children of these countries. Developing countries can be forgiven
for treating our often selective moralism with the cynicism it deserves. At the same
time, they need to treat the moral issues seriously, sorting out the bad from the good
ideas.

282

Copyriqht © 2001. All Rights Reserved.

Jagdish Bhag~ati

to do with this distressing reality, the fear that trade was the
culprit has become widespread. 2 In fact, you will recall that the
debate over NAFTA was particularly acrimonious precisely because the unions were petrified that it would lead to job losses
and decline in the real wages of U.S. workers. In fact, one could
pla usibly argue that jus t because many Americans had this stark
image of Mexico as a source of pauper labor that was illegally
coming across in large numbers and depressing the wages of our
unskilled workers, and because they intuitively felt that free trade
with Mexico would simply be an indirect way in which this would
happen via imports of goods made with cheap labor, a most
unfortunate effect of NAFTA was to exacerbate these fears and to
undermine the political case for free trade - an outcome that
would not have happened with the Uruguay Round because freer
trade with the developing countries would have been swamped
by the man y other issues negotiated at the round.3 In fact, this
debate has not surfaced in the same way, and with the same
passion, in that context to date.
I suspect that this fear of freer trade with the South, no matter
how exaggerated, wilJ dominate trade policy through the rest of
this millenium. The effect will be precisely w hat we observed in
the case of N AFfA: attempts at linking cost-raising issues somehow with trade liberalization of the developing countries. Thus,
attempts w ere made then, and conceded in spirit though without
serious teeth, to raise Mexico's minimum wages, to raise its labor
standards and to improve its industry's environmental standards
as well.

2.

3.

For a detailed analytical and empirical analysis of this question, see Jagd ish Bhagwati
and Vivek Dehejia, "Freer Trad e and Real Wages of the Unskilled: Is Marx Strik ing
Aga in?" in Bhagwati and Marvi n Kosters, eds., Trade and Wages (Washington, DC:
Am erican Enterprise Institute, 1994.).
The British debate at the time of the enactment of the 1905 immigration quota
legislation , the first of its kind, happened to divide the politicians and policy
advocates into two camps: the free trad ers and free immigrationists on one side and
protectionists and anti-immigrationists on the oth er, p recisely because, as I a rgue in
the text, free trade with the countries containing paupers was considered to be similar
in effect to free immigrati?n of the paupers themselves. In fact, free im~igration \":'as
d escribed as "free trade m paupers" m that debate! See the d 1scuss10n m Jagd1sh
Bhagwati, "Free Traders and Freelmmigrationists: Strangers or Friends?"(New York:
Russell Sage Fou ndation, 1991) mimeog raphed.
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aggressive unilateralism.5
While free-trade areas and customs unions are GATT-legal,
aggressive unilateralism is not. The strengthening of the GATT,
and its Dispute Settlement Mechanism at the Uruguay Round,
make the use of Section 301 to extract concessions unilaterally
ever more difficult.
America's pursuit of free-trade areas, whether regional or
worldwide, is bound to continue, despite the renewed multilateralism centered on the GATT, though that seems now wholly
unnecessary and hence inappropriate (because one should not
want to choose preferential trading agreements, particularly
when nondiscriminatory free trade is possible). So is the U.S.
attachment to aggressive unilateralism, somehow. For no matter
why these policy options were arrived at earlier, U.S. policy
makers cannot help but see them as useful instruments for advancing its self-interest. I think that we now confront a model of
the "selfish hegemon," just as my former teacher Charles P.
Kindleberger advanced the influential thesis of the "altruistic
hegemon."
Kindleberger thought of the United States's backing of the
GATT and the liberal international trading regime after
the Second World War as a public good. Now the United
States is in what Douglas Irwin and I have called the
"diminished giant syndrome," where it finally wants to look
after its own interest. It seeks therefore to redefine the
trading system to reflect its own needs and priorities,
defined increasingly by its own lobbies: seeking excessive
intellectual property protection, exploiting environmental
and labor issues to reduce competitive pressures, and so
on. It then uses free-trade areas as an incentive strategy and
301 as a punishment strategy to bargain to great advantage with

s.

See, for instance, the essays in Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh Patrick, eds., Aggressive
Unilateralism: America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System (Ann Arbor, tvll:
University of Michigan Press, 1991) and Bhagwati, Tire Wvr/,d Tmding System at Risk.

284

Copyright© 2001 . All Rights Reserved.

Jagdish Bhagwati

to keep arguing that the fears of immiserization of the proletariat
from freer trade with the South are misplaced, that the real problem has to do with technical change, that the policy that can help
address the issue is not protectionism but rather encouragement
of widespread skill formation to diffuse the benefits of the technological revolution that favors skills, and that such encouragement of environmental and labor concerns as we seek
on other grounds should be done not by linking them to trade
rights and access (which will inevitably be captured by protectionists and those seeking to rip off the developing countries
instead of really wanting to improve and help them), but by
suasion, as through subsidizing activity of non-governmental
organizations.
The second question of some importance today is our attitude
toward multilateralism, since we have come to embrace, and
possibly get addicted to, both regionalism and aggressive
unilateralism. Our embrace of NAFTA was largely inspired by the
fact that the process of getting a multilateral negotiation started
at the GATT had stalled in 1982, when the European Community
(E.C.) refused to go along. In essence, we then served notice that
we would try alternative ways of getting to worldwide freer
trade, the chief one being the use of free-trade areas. The CanadaU.S. Free Trade Agreement did work to jump-start the GAIT, as
the E.C. did turn around and agree in 1986 to the Uruguay Round,
and to the inclusion of several new issues such as agriculture and
services. But the dynamic of regionalism has been such that we
have now pushed it beyond Canada and, despite the success of
the round and the GATT, to Mexico - and we now seek to push
it to other countries.
Similarly, we have become addicted to the use of Section 301 of
the 1974 and 1988 trade acts - the use of trade threats to extract
concessions from other countries concerning all sorts of issues
where we unilaterally define and determine these other countries
to be indulging in "unreasonable" and "unfair" trading practices,
regardless of whether any treaty-defined obligations exist on
their part to do so. This is what economists have now come to call
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individual countries, especially developing and smaller ones,6 and
then goes to the GATT, where these favorable bargains are codified
by a divided, partially coopted and weakened opposition. Had
U.S. negotiators gone straight to the GATI and tried to bargain
directly with everyone, however, they would have extracted a
much inferior bargain.
I suspect most lobbies, with their own agendas, are now aware
of these advantages of the FTA-cum-301 Selfish Hegemon
Strategy. I believe therefore that we are now saddled with these
instrumentalities even though they are truly dissonant with the
spirit of genuine multilateralism. Unless the United States regains
confidence in its hegemony and the good sense and vision that
the trading system must benefit all, traits that characterized U.S.
political leadership for nearly half a century will be a matter only
for nostalgia.

6.

Thus, facing the United States in a one-on-one bargain, Mexican President Ca rlos
Salinas had to accept the worst possible terms on intellectual property protection,
something that the United States cou.Jd not extract at the GAIT earlier. Then, the
Mexican acceptance of these outrageous terms was touted by the United States as the
"model" which others should follow, with Special 301 threats and actions leveled at
particularly recalcitrant countries. In the end, the tenns that the United States and
other OECD countries alongside extracted from the developing countries on
intellectual property p rotection were dramatically one-sided and certainly excessive
from even a worldwide efficiency viewpoint, thanks to the strategy that I have
identified in the text.
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